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The future of elections seems to be electronic voting systems
due to its advantages over the traditional voting. Nowadays,
there are some different paradigms to ensure the security and
reliability of e-voting. This is a topic in continuous development.
This document is part of a wider project which presents
an e-Voting platform based on elliptic curve cryptography.
It uses an hybrid combination of two of the main e-Voting
paradigms to guarantee privacy and security in the counting
phase, these are precisely, the mixnets and the homomorphic
protocols.
This document is focused in the description of the system
and the maths and programming needed to solve the homomor-
phic part of it. In later chapters, there is a comparison between
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The electoral process is the most important and fundamental activity
in democracy because it makes possible to represent every person in the
population. For common people this is the only way to participate actively
in politics and the process main goal is to determine the government for the
next years.
Consequently, it moves lots of interests and many attempts of fraud
and manipulation cases have happened during the history. This is why the
electoral process must be a open process paying special attention to security
and reliability.
The traditional electoral process consists on a system where every
person is called to move to a college and deposit its vote there. Then the
votes are counted manually by the people who have been supervising the
correct deposit of votes.
It is evident that traditional voting has some disadvantages such as
the lot of time needed for the manual counting and the error probabilities of
it, besides the displacement to the college of every person who participates.
Moreover, the time and economic cost are also high.
Nowadays, with the big advances and improvements in the world of
the new technologies, added to the fact that practically everybody has
access to them, it seems reasonable to develop a new way of voting which
uses these technologies. The objective is to make electoral process more
comfortable, secure and universal. These new systems are known as Elec-
tronic Voting, or simply e-Voting.
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1.1. Properties of an e-voting process
E-voting is more comfortable because it allows you to vote remotely.
People can use their home computer or even their mobile phone and send
the vote through the Internet. It avoids the need to move to the college and
improves the accessibility and the availability problems that someone may
have.
Another evident advantage is the fact that vote counting is performed
by computers. So that the process will be significantly faster and the errors
disappear. The same happens with the possible recounts and verifications.
The whole process must be trusted by participants. For this reason,
the most modern and advanced cryptography is used. Nowadays, there is
a lot of research on how to improve the efficiency and robustness of the
e-Voting protocols.
1.1 Properties of an e-voting process
Regarding the topics we are talking about, we must define and accomplish
a set of properties to have a correct voting. The system must ensure the
following aspects:
• Authentication: Every vote has to come from a person who is registered
in the electorate. The system must ensure participants vote only once.
• Integrity : The content of each vote has to rest immutable through all
the electoral process.
• Privacy : It must not be possible to link the voter with the content of
his vote. This implies the non-coercion possibility.
• Intermediate privacy : The partial results must be secret until the voting
process is closed.
• Accuracy : The result has to be exactly which the votes contain.
• Verifiability : Everybody should be able to verify that his vote has been
included and counted properly.
Some of these properties can be easily broken in the traditional voting process
by human errors. Nevertheless, electronic voting must provide, with verifiable
processes, a high rate of accomplishment.
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1.2 State of the art
There is an extended documentation about electronic voting, covering a
wide range of topics. This is due to the fact that electronic voting can be
split in a number of different types of problems focusing in the different
properties announced in the previous section. That includes: authentication
protocols like digital signature, anonymity in the sending phase, ensure that
the voting device does not save information about the vote, and many others.
For a real e-voting platform all these aspects should be analysed and
implemented. Our project is mainly focused in the counting phase. Conse-
quently, this document only exposes the protocols that implement privacy
in this phase, allowing verifications and ensuring the integrity of votes.
1.2.1 Homomorphic tally protocols
These protocols use the homomorphic property of some cryptosystems (ex.
ElGamal, EC-ElGamal, Paillier, ...). This property makes that a certain
operation applied on a pair of ciphertexts, coincides with the encryption of
the message resulting from the operation on their cleartexts.
There are two types of homomorphism depending the involved opera-
tion:
• Additive Homomorphism: E(v1)⊕ E(v2) = E(v1 + v2)
• Multiplicative Homomorphism: E(v1)⊕ E(v2) = E(v1 · v2)
That is useful in the electronic voting because we can join the votes when
they are encrypted and at the end of the process just decrypt the final bullet.
The most interesting fact of this protocol, apart of decreasing the number
of decryptions we have to calculate, is that the decrypted aggregated result
can not be directly linked with any voter. That is because the decrypted
cleartexts do not come from the encrypted votes that voters have emit.
We can list the advantages of homomorphic protocols:
• The privacy problem is solved, except the coercion part.
• The final counting is fast because it consists of a simple decryption.
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But there also exist some disadvantages, that become intractable when the
voting is complex.
• In homomorphic tally the voting options have to be prefixed. This does
not permit text or numerical input.
• So as to detect possible corrupted votes, the verification has to be done
when the votes are still encrypted, before applying the homomorphic
operation. This can be done with the zero-knowledge-proofs. The draw-
back is that such proofs are computationally expensive and require a
lot of time.
• Vote format has to allow repetition of the homomorphic operation
for a large amount of times. If the voting is big enough decoding the
cleartext becomes a challenging problem.
1.2.2 Mixnet protocols
The mixnet is another process to ensure the privacy of voting by breaking
the relation between the voter and its vote.
In this case the process is done when all votes are collected but they
are not decrypted yet. The functionality is similar to the traditional voting
where the votes are in boxes and they are shacked and mixed. In the
electronic voting this is done by means of a process that shuffles and
re-encrypts the votes in a way that makes hard to infer the path through
the mixnet.
Finally, when the correlation is broken,votes can be decrypted.
Its advantages are:
• Corrupted votes are simply discarded.
• The privacy is ensured.
Nevertheless, some disadvantages appear:
• The process requires a big number of re-encryptions whose correctness
is hard to compute.
• Vote counting is not as efficient as the homomorphic protocol because
the votes must be decrypted one by one.
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1.3 About this project
This project is part of an electronic voting platform developed and imple-
mented by the Cryptography and Graphs research group of the University
of Lleida in collaboration with Scytl Secure Electronic Voting, SL. This
collaboration is funded by the Ministry of Industry under the Avanza
program. TSI-020100-2010-185.
During the course 2010/2011 I have been working, collectively with
Núria Busom and Oriol Carro, as this project grant-holder.
Our objective is to test and see the viability of an electronic voting
system with the following characteristics:
• It uses a cryptosystem based on elliptic curves, more precisely, the EC-
ElGamal cryptosystem. It has been selected due to its fulfilment of
the additive homomorphism property and because the number of bits
required for a good security level is smaller than other cryptosystems
not based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
• It implements a hybrid solution involving the two actual paradigms of
electronic voting, attempting to take advantage of both and minimizing
their negative characteristics. The key is to find the best possible mix
to make the voting process as computationally efficient as possible.
Particularly, this thesis is focused on how to apply the homomorphic property
in elliptic curves finding a way to code and decode vote packages of a given
size. The harder problem is the decoding phase since it involves a discrete
logarithm problem over the group of points of an elliptic curve or a Knapsack
problem, which are very hard to compute.
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The modular arithmetic is the base of the modern cryptography and public
key cryptography in particular. The initial idea is quite simple: we fix
a positive integer N , called modulo. Then, given two integers, we say a
and b are congruent modulo N and we write a ≡ b (mod N) if N divides a−b.
We define a group as a set with a binary operation, which has an
identity element, is associative, and every element has an inverse. If the
operation is commutative the group is said to be Abelian.
A group G is called cyclic if it has a generator g. A generator is an
element from which every other group element can be obtained. Depending
on the operation used to obtain the elements we can classify the cyclic
groups in:
• Multiplicative group (G, ·): g· n). . . ·g = gn
• Additive group (G,+): g+ n). . . +g = n · g
A field is a set with two operations (K,+, ·) where:
• (K,+) is an Abelian group with identity denoted by 0.
• (K− {0}, ·) is a group.
• (K,+, ·) satisfies the distributive law.
15
2.2. Elliptic Curves
There is a fact in modular arithmetic which has a lot of interest in cryptog-
raphy. Not all the elements in the ring ZN of integers modulo N have inverse.
The modular inverse of an element only exists when this element e and N
are co-prime, gcd(e,N) = 1. Then if N is a prime p all non-zero elements
have a unique inverse, and Zp is a field, often denoted by Fp. For that reason,
it is interesting to work in Fp, the finite prime field of characteristic p.
2.2 Elliptic Curves
In this project we use protocols based on elliptic curves because they offer an
improved efficiency and bandwidth in contrast to other public key systems.
Furthermore, when defined over elliptic curves, the discrete logarithm
problem, which is the base of the project cryptosystem, is harder to solve.
An elliptic curve E over a field K is given by the Weierstrass equa-
tion:
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6,
where ai ∈ K and ∆ 6= 0 , being ∆ the discriminant which is defined as:
∆ = −b22b8 − 8b34 − 27b26 + 9b2b4b6,
b2 = a
2





1a6 + 4a2a6 − a1a3a4 + a2a23 − a24
The K-rational points in the affine plane are the points of (x, y) ∈ K2 which
satisfy the equation of the curve E. The set of these points together with
the point at infinity O is denoted E(K).
If the characteristic of K is different from 2 and 3, the equation of
the curve E can be simplified and expressed with the reduced Weierstrass
form:
E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b, a, b ∈ K
with discriminant: ∆ = −16(4a3 + 27b2) 6= 0.
In the figure 2.1 we show an example of an elliptic curve over the real field.
All figures in this section will represent elliptic curves over real numbers for
their better understanding, but in cryptography elliptic curves are defined
over finite fields. Particularly we will work over Fp (however it’s also possible
16
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Figure 2.1: An elliptic curve over R
to work over binary fields F2m or even Fq, q = pm). So, we can define the
domain set where we work as:
E(Fp) = {(x, y) ∈ Fp × Fp | y2 = x3 + ax+ b} ∪ O.
2.2.1 Point Addition
The addition operation over E(K) can be defined with the chord-tangent
method. Together with this addition operation, the set of points E(K) forms
an Abelian group with O serving as its identity.
The best way to see this addition rule is geometrically. For the addi-
tion of two points we have to trace the line over them and select the opposite
of the third point of the curve that the line cuts. In the case we want to do
a point doubling (P + P ) we will trace the first line as the curve tangent at
the point P .
We can see this procedure in the figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Elliptic curve point addition operation
Analytically, the addition operation can be defined as follows:
Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2), be points of E(K). Then the addi-
tion point P +Q = (x3, y3) is given by:




(y1 − y2)/(x1 − x2), if x1 6= x2,
(3x22 + a)/2y1, if x1 = x2 and y1 6= −y2.
The algorithm we adopted to implement this operation in our project
is described in the algorithm 2.2.1.
It is interesting to highlight that the opposite of a point P = (x, y) is quickly
obtained as −P = (x,−y).
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Algorithm 2.2.1 Elliptic Curve Point Addition
Input: P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2) | P,Q ∈ E(Fp)
Output: S = P +Q
if P = O then
return Q
end if
if Q = O then
return P
end if
if x1 = x2 then
if y1 = −y2 then
return O
else
λ = (3 · x22 + a)/(2 · y1)
end if
else
λ = (y1 − y2)/(x1 − x2)
end if
X ← λ2 − x1 − x2
Y ← λ · (x1 − x3)− y1
return Point(X, Y )
2.2.2 Point Multiplication
The point multiplication operation over elliptic curves is the k · P operation
where k ∈ Z and P ∈ E(Fp), which is defined as k · P = P · k). . . ·P . The
best way to compute it is using the binary method, based on doubling and
adding points as many times as needed. For example, 21 · P can be calcu-
lated using following expression which reduces the amount of point additions:
21 · P = 2 · (2 · (2 · (2 · P ) + P )) + P.
Hence, we can use the algorithm 2.2.2 which uses the binary representation
of the operand to produce the described results.
An improvement to this multiplication method is achieved by reducing the
number of 1’s in the operand representation. This can be done by the NAF
(Non-Adjacent Form) representation. For further information about NAF
methods we refer the reader to [5].
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Algorithm 2.2.2 Binary Method for Point Multiplication on an elliptic
curve
Input: k = (kt−1, ..., k1, k0)2, P ∈ E(Fp)
Output: k · P
Q← O
for i = 0→ t− 1 do
if ki = 1 then
Q← Q+ P
end if




The cryptographic systems which best fit in Electronic-Voting environments
are the Public-Key Cryptosystems [9] [12] since they do not require a secure
initial exchange of the secret keys between the sender and receiver. It would
be an unachievable work to distribute a secret key for every voter.
The ElGamal cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme defined
over a cyclic group G where the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)[9] is
intractable. In the basic ElGamal case explained in this section, we will
assume it is defined over F∗p.
So, we define the parameters of the cryptosystem by selecting:
• A subgroup G of order a prime n of F∗p.
• g a generator of G.
Key generation:
• Choose a random integer a ∈ [2, n− 1].
• Calculate h = ga (mod p).






• Obtain p, g and h form the public key.
• Represent the message as an integer m in the range {0, 1, ..., p− 1}.
• Select a random integer r, 1 ≤ r ≤ n− 1.
• Compute γ = gr (mod p) and δ = m · hr (mod p).




• Use the private key a to compute γ−a (mod p).
• Recover m by computing (γ−a) · δ (mod p).














ElGamal has the multiplicative homomorphic property we need for our
project but the recommended key length for having enough security is 1024
or 2048 bits.
Therefore, we decided to use the EC-ElGamal cryptosystem, an adap-
tation of ElGamal over elliptic curves [8] [10]. It keeps the homomorphic
property we are looking for and the Discrete Logarithm Problem is harder




The EC-ElGamal cryptosystem is defined with the following set of parame-
ters, which have to be shared among the users of the cryptosystem:
• Define a finite field, in our case Fp, being p a large prime.
• Choose an elliptic curve E over Fp defined by the coefficients a and b
of the Weierstrass equation.
• Determine a cyclic subgroup G of E(Fp) and a generator P of G.
• n will be the order of the group G and h the cofactor.
EC-ElGamal parameters = (p, a, b, P, n, h)
Key generation:
• Choose a random integer x ∈ [2, n− 1].
• Calculate Q = x · P .




• Obtain the cryptosystem parameters and the public key Q.
• Represent the message as a point M of the elliptic curve E(Fp).
• Select a random integer r, 1 ≤ r ≤ n− 1.
• Compute R = r · P and S = M + r ·Q.




• Use the private key x to compute x ·R.
• Recover M by subtracting x ·R to S. M = S − x ·R.
22
2.5. Security
It is easy to see that the decryption operation returns the cleartext:
S − (x ·R) = (M + r ·Q)− x(r · P ) = (M + r ·Q)− r(x · P )
= (M + r ·Q)− r ·Q = M.
It is possible to perform re-encryptions to ciphertexts:
• Select a random integer r′, 1 ≤ r′ ≤ n− 1.
• Modify the cipher-text with R = R + r′ · P and S = S + r′ ·Q.
We can see that this process modifies the ciphertext, but preserves the clear-
text:
ReEncryption(Encryption(M)) = (r · P + r′ · P,M + r ·Q+ r′ ·Q)
= ((r + r′) · P,M + (r + r′) ·Q).
In a similar way we can see the additive homomorphism property of this
cryptosystem:
Encryption(M) = (r · P,M + r ·Q),
Encryption(M ′) = (r′ · P,M ′ + r′ ·Q),
Enc(M) +Enc(M ′) = ((r+ r′) ·P,M +M ′+ (r+ r′) ·Q) decryption−−−−−−→M +M ′.
2.5 Security
The two cryptosystems presented in previous sections have a good security
level. Both of them base their security in the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP), which results NP-complete over finite fields.
The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is defined as follows: given a
cyclic group (G, ·), with order n and g being the generator of G. Given the
element x ∈ G, find an integer a such that ga = g· a). . . ·g = x.
Its homonymous on elliptic curves is the Elliptic Curve Discrete Loga-
rithm Problem (ECDLP)[6] which is enunciated in the following way: given
an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp, a generator point P of a group
23
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G and order n of E(Fp) and a point Q ∈ G. Find the integer k such that
Q = k · P , also expressed as k = logP Q.
In the next table 2.1, their security is compared. From this table we
can clearly see how the EC-ElGamal achieve the same security of ElGamal
with shorter keys.
Security Bits ElGamal EC-ElGamal











In order to introduce our electronic voting platform, the first thing to say, is
that it was conceived as a testing platform for voting protocols using elliptic
curve cryptography. It is not intended to be a real application platform,
since other fundamental aspects have not been considered so as to simplify
the implementation. A representative example is the non-existence of an
authentication process.
With this idea in mind, we proceed to describe the voting platform in
terms of their functional parts. Then we describe it from the point of view
of the cryptographic operations involved in the process.
3.1 Functional scheme
The system has three participants: the voters, a college (or polling station)
and a server.
The functional scheme follows these steps:
1. The server creates the voting process. It includes:
• Initialization of the cryptosystem (keys generation).
• Definition of the list of integers that represent each candidate.
2. The server shares the public key and the parameters of the cryptosys-
tem in a public XML.
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Figure 3.1: Functional Scheme
3. The voter selects a candidate. To encrypt the vote, it multiplies the
candidate representation by the generator point and encrypts the result.
4. Then the voter sends the vote to the college.
5. When the college receives a vote:
• Performs input verifications.
• Collects them in n-size packages applying the homomorphic oper-
ation.
6. When the voting time has finished, the college:
• Starts the mixing process of all the packages of grouped votes.
• Generates the verification proofs of correct mixing.
7. The college sends the mixed packages to the server.
8. The server decrypts and decodes the packages and counts the results.
9. The results are published.
Finally, and optionally, some mixing and other zero-knowledge verifications
can be performed.
26
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3.2 Hybrid system between Mixnets and Ho-
momorphic tally
The main characteristic of our platform is the combination of the homomor-
phic cryptography paradigm with the mixnet nodes. This combination tries
to exploit the benefits of both and minimize their efficiency weaknesses.
To implement this hybrid system we have created the package object.
It is a collector of a determined capacity of votes through the homomorphic
operation. Then the mixnet nodes work with packages and not with single
votes.
The figure 3.2 exposes the operation made when we track the path
that votes follow through the hybrid system.
Figure 3.2: Hybrid paradigm process
The process is:
1. Candidate Selection. The point P is the generator of a cyclic group
of the group of points of an elliptic curve used by the cryptosystem. The
set {c0, c1, c2, ..., cm} are the integers which represent each candidate. In
next chapter it is explained how they are selected for coding purposes.
The elliptic curve message for the selected candidate i is going to be:
Mi = ci · P.
27
3.2. Hybrid system between Mixnets and Homomorphic tally
2. Encryption of the votes using EC-ElGamal cryptosystem:
ei = encryption(Mi) = (ri · P,Mi + ri ·Q),
where Q is the public key and ri is a random integer.
3. Packaging. We aggregate the votes employing the homomorphic op-
eration of the cryptosystem:
Packagej = ...+ ei−1 + ei + ei+1 + ...
= (r · P, (...+Mi−1 +Mi +Mi+1 + ...) + r ·Q),
where r = ...+ ri−1 + ri + ri+1 + ... .
4. Mixing. Here the packages are shuffled and re-encrypted. This process
is explained with more detail in my partner Oriol’s thesis [3]:
(Package1, Package2, Package3, ...)
↓↙↘
(Packagek1 , Packagek2 , Packagek3 , ...).
5. Decryption of the packages using the private key of EC-ElGamal cryp-
tosystem:
D = decryption(Packagekj) = ...+Mi−1 +Mi +Mi+1 + ... .
6. Decoding. For decoding we must efficiently solve a knapsack problem
as explained in the next chapter:
Find (x1, x2, ..., xm) where D = (x1 · c1 + x2 · c2 + ...+ xm · cm)P.
7. Result counting. The sum of the votes for each candidate:∑
every decrypted package
(x1, x2, ..., xm).
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The benefits of this process are:
• The privacy is highly ensured.
• The final count is faster than the one in mixing protocols because it
has to decrypt less ciphertexts. In our hybrid case, it has to decrypt
as many as the number of packages. By contrast, the simple mixing
protocol has to decrypt as many ciphertexts as votes.
• The mixing times are significantly decreased. It happens again because
it is performed over the packages and not over the single votes.
In conclusion, we achieve a computationally efficient protocol without over-
looking the privacy security.
3.3 Implementation details
To implement the system described above we have used the Java language.
It is not an efficient environment but there exist two influential reasons for
which we have chosen this language.
First of all, it is an object-oriented paradigm language with a clear C
like syntax and a lot of tools and API’s that makes programming easy. In
a second place, previously the Cryptography and Graphs research group
(UdL) has worked on a similar voting system project which was programmed
with Java. Hence, we have reused some of the cryptographic classes already
implemented.
On the elliptic curve point representation, we have used the standard
Java class: java.security.spec.ECPoint. Even though, we have encapsulated
it in a new class adding some more functionalities to the ones it offers.
The curves selected for the system test and debug were those recom-
mended by Certicom Researchers in their article Recommended Elliptic






This module is responsible of the implementation of the homomorphic
paradigm in the electronic voting system. The idea is not to do the homo-
morphic operation to join all the votes in one single bullet, but join them in
packages of a determined capacity of votes.
In this way, we can work with acceptable sized packages to decrypt
them in terms of efficiency, reducing significantly the set of bullets we have
to introduce in the mix process.
To implement this, we can split the process in two differenced tasks:
• Firstly, find a package codification suitable for putting all votes in a sin-
gle package, ensuring that the repetition of the homomorphic operation
will not alter the meaning of the final package.
• Secondly, choose a decoding algorithm that minimizes the time to find
the quantification of every candidate votes.
4.1 Package Coding
The coding is quite simple. Suppose n is the package capacity, that is,
the maximum number of votes we can put together in a package. And
suppose m is the number of candidates. Finally, we must define a generator
P of the group of points of the elliptic curve E defined over Fp we have chosen.
The first candidate C0 will be represented as P if he receives one
vote, 2 · P if he receives two votes, until n · P if he receives all the possible
votes of the package. Then, the second candidate, C1, will be represented
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with (n + 1) · P if he has one vote, 2 · (n + 1) · P if he has two votes, until
n · (n+ 1) · P if he has all votes.
According to this method we complete table 4.1.
1 Vote 2 Votes 3 Votes ... n Votes
C0 P 2 · P 3 · P ... n · P
C1 (n+ 1) · P 2(n+ 1) · P 3(n+ 1) · P ... n(n+ 1) · P
C2 (n+ 1)
2 · P 2(n+ 1)2 · P 3(n+ 1)2 · P ... n(n+ 1)2 · P
... ... ... ... ... ...
Cm (n+ 1)
m · P 2(n+ 1)m · P 3(n+ 1)m · P ... n(n+ 1)m · P
Table 4.1: Decoding process
From this table we can deduce that an empty package will be initialized
to O. Then we will add (n + 1)candidate · P , where candidate is the number
of the selected candidate. It is important to highlight that the number of
added votes in the package is never higher than its capacity, which in the
table is represented by n.
4.2 Package Decoding
The decoding process is the main and most challenging task in homomorphic
protocols. In the group of points of an elliptic curve, it becomes a knapsack
problem which represents a NP-complete problem. This is the reason why
our packages have a size limitation: to have tractable instances of the
problem.
The definition of the decoding is simple: we have to find the factor
which the generator is multiplied by, to become the value of the package.
We will denote:
Q : Package Point
P : Generator of the group of points of the elliptic curve.
x : The factor, being x0, x1, x2, ..., xm the votes for each candidate, that is
x = x0 + x1(n+ 1) + x2(n+ 1)
2 + ...+ xm(n+ 1)
m, such that,
Q = x · P.
32
4.2. Package Decoding
The näıve algorithm to find x is also simple. It is an exhaustive search com-
paring Q with the domain of the package {P, 2·P, 3·P, ..., ((n+1)m+1−1)·P}.
The cost of this search is exponential. For this reason in the next sections
we try to achieve a better solution, which in our case is efficient due to the
size of n.
Below we have proposed two options to solve the decoding problem:
the Baby-Step Giant-Step solution and the Knapsack solution.
4.2.1 Baby-Step Giant-Step solution
One possibility is to deal with the problem in two parts. The first step,
is to find x taking it directly as the discrete logarithm problem over
the group of points of an elliptic curve (ECDLP) with a good solver for
tractable instances. Once we have got the integer x, we will decompose it in
{x0, x1, x2, ..., xm}.
Q = x · P → x = logPQ→ decompose x in terms of {x0, x1, x2, ..., xm}
There is a wide range of studies and algorithms about solving the ECDLP.
We have choose the Baby-Step Giant-Step algorithm [9] (Algorithm 4.2.1)
because it has a good efficiency (although it has an exponential cost) and
it is relatively easy to implement. However, we can find more complex and
efficient algorithms like Pollard’s rho algorithm.
Algorithm 4.2.1 Baby-Step Giant-Step algorithm over Elliptic Curves
Input: An elliptic curve E over Fp, of group order a prime q, a generator P
for E(Fp) and Q a point of E(Fp).
Output: The integer x, where x = logPQ
1: l← √q
2: Construct a table with the key (Q − j · P ) and value j , for each j ∈
{0, 1, ..., l}
3: for 0 ≤ i ≤ l do
4: key ← i · l · P
5: if key is in the table then





Once we have obtained the integer x such that Q = x ·P , we only have to de-
compose this integer. We do it dividing it by the weight of the candidate with
the biggest representation. The result is the votes for this candidate. Then
we proceed by dividing the quotient for the weight of the next candidate in
the representation other. We repeat the process until we decode all the votes.
4.2.2 Knapsack solution
A second approximation to the problem is taking it as a Knapsack Problem
(sometimes called the Subset Sum Problem)[7] where we have to find the
values of {x0, x1, x2, ..., xm} so as to solve the equation:
Q = x0 · P + x1(n+ 1) · P + ...+ xm(n+ 1)m · P.
Managing the problem as described above has some advantages over solving
the ECDLP problem directly:
• We can filter the situations we already know that never happen. For
example x0 + x1 + ...+ xm can not be larger than n.
• We can start searching the most probable candidate combinations.
This improvement has not been implemented in this project, even
though, it is more extensively described in the Future Work section.
The Knapsack solver algorithm we have choose has again a relatively easy
implementation with a reasonably good efficiency. It is the Meet in the
Middle Algorithm (Algotithm 4.2.2), one of the best in solving the Knapsack
in general cases with a cost of O(n2n/2). Moreover, it has an easy and direct
adaptation to work over elliptic curves.
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Algorithm 4.2.2 Meet in the Middle over EC
Input: An elliptic curve E over Fp, a generator P for E(Fp), Q a point of
E(Fp), the capacity n of the package and the number m of candidates.
Output: The set {x0, x1, ..., xm}, such that
∑m
i=0 xi · (n+ 1)iP = Q
1: Set t← n/2
2: Create a Map
3: for all {x0, x1, ..., xt} combinations where 0 ≤ xi ≤ n do
4: key ← Q−
∑t
i=0 xi · (n+ 1)iP
5: if key = 0 then
6: return {x0, ..., xt, 0, ...n/2..., 0}
7: else
8: Insert in the map and entry with key key and value {x0, ..., xt}
9: end if
10: end for
11: for all {xt, xt+1..., xn} combinations where 0 ≤ xi ≤ n do
12: key ←
∑n
i=t xi · (n+ 1)iP
13: if key is in the map then
14: {x0, x1, ..., xt} ← mapkey value
15: return {x0, x1, ..., xt} + {xt, xt+1..., xn}
16: end if
17: end for
18: return Null Solution
This Knapsack algorithm and the previous BSGS algorithm have a similar
computational cost. However, it is not necessary to go over the combinations
in any strict order. This is valid for both the table construction and the
table search processes. The only requirement is to pass over all possible
combinations.
This means we can alter the order introducing the improvements de-
scribed above regarding the non-use of impossible combinations and starting
the search for the most probable ones.
Consequently, the function that decides which element should be the
next to be evaluated is crucial for a good efficiency. The one we have
implemented in this project is described in Algorithm 4.2.2.
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Algorithm 4.2.3 Next Combination
Input: The last {x0, x1, ..., xn/2} combination
Output: The following combination or and advise if it is the last one
1: repeat
2: i← 0
3: while combination not changed do
4: if xi < n then
5: xi ← xi + 1
6: combination← changed
7: else
8: if i = n/2 then
9: return Last Combination
10: else
11: xi ← 0




16: suma = x0 + x1 + . . .+ xn/2
17: until suma > pakage capacity
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4.3 Comparisons and Chosen Proposal
To decide which algorithm is the best, we have implemented and compared
both of them: Figure 4.1 compares the required time to unpack a single pack
in a 6 candidates voting simulation. The test is done for different package
sizes.
Figure 4.1: Unpack algorithms comparison
We can appreciate that the Knapsack problem used to be faster than the
BSGS Algorithm. We can also note, their behaviour tent to be the same
when increasing the package sizes. Therefore, for its better results, plus the
highest flexibility provided in the selection of the searching path, the chosen
proposal was the Knapsack one.
37




In this chapter we present the execution times of the implementation of our
system. We also analyse its behaviour with respect to some of the parameters
which may vary in a voting process.
5.1 Analysis of our hybrid system proposal
The first thing we see is that the times vary linearly with the increment
of the census. For this reason, we conclude that the census is not a vital
parameter. The figure 5.1 displays this fact.
Figure 5.1: Census behaviour
39
5.1. Analysis of our hybrid system proposal
After that, we have separated the times of the system in the following
representative parts: candidate selection, mixing process (and mixing
verification) and decoding and decryption phase (with its verifications).
The candidate selection time can be ignored, because it is obtained in
a random selection process. However, in a real voting process it takes as
much time as the voters need to decide their vote.
To observe the times of the Mixing process and the Decryption and
Decoding phase, a key parameter is the package size. This is because it
determines the input elements the mixing has and also the size of search
domain which the decoding must face.
Then we can observe that mixing times decrease exponentially when
the package size grows. By contrast, the decoding time increases exponen-
tially. So, as we can appreciate in the figure 5.2, there is an optimum package
size that minimizes the overall time.
Figure 5.2: Optimum package size
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Moreover, as the mixing is repeated as many times as the number of
nodes the mixing process has, the process varies linearly with the number of
nodes. See figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Mixing times
A more interesting fact is that when we increment the number of eligible
candidates the decoding phase increases its exponential degree. See figure
5.4.
Summarizing, considering the amount of mix nodes and the number of
candidates, we have a different optimum package size that minimizes the
time.
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During the project we have studied, compared and implemented different
techniques to acquire the initial objectives.
The first objective, which was to use elliptic curve cryptography com-
patible with an homomorphic operation and a re-encryption operation, was
easy to accomplish. It has been quite straightforward by following some
bibliography and implementing the EC-ElGamal cryptosystem.
The development of the platform was not more difficult but as the
project was advancing, we noticed some unexpected problems and reached
some improvements. Consequently, it needed some rethinking and redesign
tasks.
The correct merge between the mixing paradigm and the homomor-
phic tally was the most challenging part. The graphics presented in the
analysis section show the achievement of a system that improves the single
mixing and homomorphic tally compute times fairly well.
However, it is not a finished job. In fact, it can always be improved
depending on the type and the characteristics of the voting. In the following




• An interesting approach to improve the knapsack search path is to
study the candidates priority that an election may have. Then, we can
use this information to find the solution faster. It is possible thanks to
the flexibility that Knapsack algorithms provide.
• Following the previous point, it is also possible to consider an adap-
tive search path that modifies its track according to the results of the
decoding of the previous packages.
• Better knapsack solving algorithms have been studied currently. Prob-
ably, they could be used in this project to decrease the decoding times.
• As a testing system, it could be useful to implement other proofs, cryp-
tosystems and cryptographic paradigms to enhance the comparisons
and the analysis.
• If the application has to become a real voting platform, it needs the
implementation of other security aspects not considered on this project.
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